


The Proof (continued)

- We are almost done.
- The weighted directed graph H needs to be *efficiently* replaced by some unweighted graph G.
- Furthermore, knowing #G should enable us to calculate #H efficiently.
 - This done, $\#\phi$ will have been Turing-reducible to $\#G.^{a}$
- We proceed to construct this graph G.

^aBy way of #H of course.

• Replace edges with weights 2 and 3 as follows (note that the graph cannot have parallel edges):



• The cycle count #H remains *unchanged*.

- We move on to edges with weight -1.
- First, we count the number of nodes, M.
- Each clause gadget contains 4 nodes (p. 653), and there are *m* of them (one per clause).
- Each revised XOR gadget contains 7 nodes (p. 672), and there are 3m of them (one per literal).
- Each choice gadget contains 2 nodes (p. 664), and there are $n \leq 3m$ of them (one per variable).

• So


$$M \le 4m + 21m + 6m = 31m.$$

- $#H \le 2^L$ for some $L = O(m \log m)$.
 - The maximum absolute value of the edge weight is 1.
 - Hence each term in the permanent is at most 1.
 - There are $M! \leq (31m)!$ terms.
 - Hence

$$#H \leq \sqrt{2\pi(31m)} \left(\frac{31m}{e}\right)^{31m} e^{\frac{1}{12\times(31m)}} = 2^{O(m\log m)}$$
(10)

by a refined Stirling's formula.


• Replace each edge with weight -1 with the following:



- Each increases the number of cycle covers 2^{L+1} -fold.
- The desired unweighted G has been obtained.

The Proof (continued)

• #G equals #H after replacing each appearance -1 in #H with 2^{L+1} :



- Let $#G = \sum_{i=0}^{n} a_i \times (2^{L+1})^i$, where $0 \le a_i < 2^{L+1}$.
- As $\#H \leq 2^{L}$ even if we replace -1 by 1 (p. 674), each a_i equals the number of cycle covers with *i* edges of weight -1.

The Proof (concluded)

• We conclude that

$$#H = a_0 - a_1 + a_2 - \dots + (-1)^n a_n,$$

indeed easily computable from #G.

• We know $\#H = 4^{3m} \times \#\phi$ (p. 669).

• So

$$\#\phi = \frac{a_0 - a_1 + a_2 - \dots + (-1)^n a_n}{4^{3m}}.$$

- More succinctly,

$$\#\phi = \frac{\#G \mod (2^{L+1} + 1)}{4^{3m}}$$

Polynomial Space

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PSPACE and Games

- Given a boolean expression ϕ in CNF with boolean variables x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n , is it true that $\exists x_1 \forall x_2 \cdots Q_n x_n \phi$?
- This is called **quantified satisfiability** or QSAT.
- This problem is like a two-person game: ∃ and ∀ are the two players.
- We ask then is there a winning strategy for \exists ?
- QSAT IS PSPACE-Complete^a

^aStockmeyer and Meyer (1973).

IP and PSPACE

- We next prove that $coNP \subseteq IP$.
- Shamir in 1990 proved that IP equals PSPACE using similar ideas (p. 709).

Interactive Proof for Boolean Unsatisfiability

- Like GRAPH NONISOMORPHISM (p. 538), it is not clear how to construct a short certificate for UNSAT.
- But with interaction and randomization, we shall present an interactive proof for UNSAT.
- A 3SAT formula is a conjunction of disjunctions of at most three literals.
- For any unsatisfiable 3SAT formula $\phi(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n)$, there is an interactive proof for the fact that it is unsatisfiable.
- Therefore, $coNP \subseteq IP$.

Arithmetization of Boolean Formulas

The idea is to arithmetize the boolean formula.

- $T \rightarrow positive integer$
- $F \rightarrow 0$
- $x_i \to x_i$
- $\neg x_i \rightarrow 1 x_i$
- $\lor \rightarrow +$
- $\wedge \to \times$

•
$$\phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \to \Phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$$

The Arithmetized Version

- A boolean formula is transformed into a multivariate polynomial Φ .
- It is easy to verify that ϕ is unsatisfiable if and only if

$$\sum_{x_1=0,1} \sum_{x_2=0,1} \cdots \sum_{x_n=0,1} \Phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = 0.$$

- But the above seems to require exponential time.
- We turn to more intricate methods.

Choosing the Field

- Suppose ϕ has m clauses of length three each.
- Then $\Phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \leq 3^m$ for any truth assignment $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n).$
- Because there are at most 2^n truth assignments,

$$\sum_{x_1=0,1} \sum_{x_2=0,1} \cdots \sum_{x_n=0,1} \Phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \le 2^n 3^m.$$

Choosing the Field (concluded)

• By choosing a prime $q > 2^n 3^m$ and working modulo this prime, proving unsatisfiability reduces to proving that

$$\sum_{x_1=0,1} \sum_{x_2=0,1} \cdots \sum_{x_n=0,1} \Phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \equiv 0 \mod q.$$
(11)

• Working under a *finite* field allows us to uniformly select a random element in the field.

Binding Peggy

- Peggy has to find a sequence of polynomials that satisfy a number of restrictions.
- The restrictions are imposed by Victor: After receiving a polynomial from Peggy, Victor sets a new restriction for the next polynomial in the sequence.
- These restrictions guarantee that if ϕ is unsatisfiable, such a sequence can always be found.
- However, if ϕ is not unsatisfiable, any Peggy has only a small probability of finding such a sequence.
 - The probability is taken over Victor's coin tosses.

The Algorithm

- 1: Peggy and Victor both arithmetize ϕ to obtain Φ ;
- 2: Peggy picks a prime $q > 2^n 3^m$ and sends it to Victor;
- 3: Victor rejects and stops if q is not a prime;
- 4: Victor sets $v_0 = 0$;
- 5: for i = 1, 2, ..., n do

6: Peggy calculates
$$P_i^*(z) =$$

$$\sum_{x_{i+1}=0,1} \cdots \sum_{x_n=0,1} \Phi(r_1, \dots, r_{i-1}, z, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n);$$

7: Peggy sends
$$P_i^*(z)$$
 to Victor;

- 8: Victor rejects and stops if $P_i^*(0) + P_i^*(1) \not\equiv v_{i-1} \mod q$ or $P_i^*(z)$'s degree exceeds m; $\{P_i^*(z) \text{ has at most } m \text{ clauses.}\}$
- 9: Victor uniformly picks $r_i \in Z_q$ and calculates $v_i = P_i^*(r_i)$;
- 10: Victor sends r_i to Peggy;

11: **end for**

12: Victor accepts iff $\Phi(r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_n) \equiv v_n \mod q$;

Comments

• The following invariant is maintained by the algorithm:

$$P_i^*(0) + P_i^*(1) \equiv P_{i-1}^*(r_{i-1}) \mod q \tag{12}$$

$$- P_i^*(0) + P_i^*(1) \text{ equals} \\ \sum_{x_i=0,1} \cdots \sum_{x_n=0,1} \Phi(r_1, \dots, r_{i-1}, x_i, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n) \\ \text{modulo } q.$$

- The above equals $P_{i-1}^*(r_{i-1}) \mod q$ by definition.

for $1 \le i \le n$.

Comments (concluded)

- The computation of v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_n must rely on Peggy's supplied polynomials as Victor does not have the power to carry out the exponential-time calculations.
- But $\Phi(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n)$ in Step 12 is computed without relying on Peggy.

Completeness

- Suppose ϕ is unsatisfiable.
- For $i \ge 1$, by Eq. (12) on p. 688,

$$P_i^*(0) + P_i^*(1)$$

$$= \sum_{x_i=0,1} \sum_{x_{i+1}=0,1} \cdots \sum_{x_n=0,1} \Phi(r_1, \dots, r_{i-1}, x_i, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n)$$

$$= P_{i-1}^*(r_{i-1})$$

$$\equiv v_{i-1} \mod q.$$

Completeness (concluded)

• In particular at i = 1, because ϕ is unsatisfiable, we have

$$P_1^*(0) + P_1^*(1) = \sum_{x_1=0,1} \cdots \sum_{x_n=0,1} \Phi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

= v_0
= $0 \mod q.$

- Finally, $v_n = P_n^*(r_n) = \Phi(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n).$
- Because all the tests by Victor will pass, Victor will accept ϕ .

Soundness

- Suppose ϕ is not unsatisfiable.
- Victor will reject after an honest Peggy sends $P_1^*(z)$.

$$- P_1^*(z) = \sum_{x_2=0,1} \cdots \sum_{x_n=0,1} \Phi(z, x_2, \dots, x_n).$$

- So

$$P_1^*(0) + P_1^*(1)$$

$$= \sum_{x_1=0,1} \sum_{x_2=0,1} \cdots \sum_{x_n=0,1} \Phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$$

$$\not\equiv 0 \mod q$$
by Eq. (11) on p. 685.

- But
$$v_0 = 0$$
.

Soundness (continued)

- We will show that if Peggy is dishonest in one round (by sending a polynomial other than $P_i^*(z)$), then with high probability she must be dishonest in the next round, too.
- In the last round (Step 12), her dishonesty is exposed.

Soundness (continued)

- Let $P_i(z)$ represent the polynomial sent by Peggy in place of $P_i^*(z)$.
- Victor calculates $v_i = P_i(r_i) \mod p$.
- In order to deceive Victor in the next round, round
 i+1, Peggy must use r₁, r₂, ..., r_i to find a P_{i+1}(z) of
 degree at most m such that

 $P_{i+1}(0) + P_{i+1}(1) \equiv v_i \bmod q$

(see Step 8 of the algorithm on p. 687).

• And so on to the end, except that Peggy has no control over Step 12.

A Key Claim

Lemma 88 If $P_i^*(0) + P_i^*(1) \not\equiv v_{i-1} \mod q$, then either Victor rejects in the ith round, or $P_i^*(r_i) \not\equiv v_i \mod q$ with probability at least 1 - (m/q), where the probability is taken over Victor's choices of r_i .

- Think of $P_i^*(r_i)$ as the v_i that Victor should be computing if Peggy were honest.
- But Victor actually calculates $P_i(z)$ as v_i (Peggy claims $P_i(z)$ is $P_i^*(z)$):

 $v_i = P_i(r_i) \bmod q.$

• What Victor can do is to check for consistencies.

• If Peggy sends a $P_i(z)$ which equals $P_i^*(z)$, then

 $P_i(0) + P_i(1) = P_i^*(0) + P_i^*(1) \not\equiv v_{i-1} \mod q,$

and Victor rejects immediately.

- Suppose Peggy sends a $P_i(z)$ different from $P_i^*(z)$.
- If $P_i(z)$ does not pass Victor's test

$$P_i(0) + P_i(1) \equiv v_{i-1} \mod q?$$
 (13)

then Victor rejects and we are done, too.

The Proof of Lemma 88 (concluded)

- Finally, assume $P_i(z)$ passes the test (13) on p. 696.
- $P_i(z) P_i^*(z) \neq 0$ is a polynomial of degree at most m.
- Hence equation $P_i(z) P_i^*(z) \equiv 0 \mod q$ has at most m roots $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, i.e.,

 $P_i^*(r) \equiv P_i(r) \mod q.$

• Hence Victor will pick one of these as his r_i so that

$$P_i^*(r_i) \equiv P_i(r_i) \equiv v_i \bmod q$$

with probability at most m/q.

Soundness (continued)

- Suppose Victor does not reject in any of the first *n* rounds.
- As ϕ is not unsatisfiable,

 $P_1^*(0) + P_1^*(1) \not\equiv v_0 \mod q.$

- By Lemma 88 (p. 695) and the fact that Victor does not reject, we have $P_1^*(r_1) \not\equiv v_1 \mod q$ with probability at least 1 (m/q).
- Now by Eq. (12) on p. 688,

$$P_1^*(r_1) = P_2^*(0) + P_2^*(1) \not\equiv v_1 \mod q.$$

Soundness (concluded)

• Iterating on this procedure, we eventually arrive at

 $P_n^*(r_n) \not\equiv v_n \bmod q$

with probability at least $(1 - m/q)^n$.

- As $P_n^*(r_n) = \Phi(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n)$, Victor's last test at Step 12 fails and he rejects.
- Altogether, Victor rejects with probability at least

$$[1 - (m/q)]^n > 1 - (nm/q) > 2/3$$
(14)

because $q > 2^n 3^m$.

An Example

- $(x_1 \lor x_2 \lor x_3) \land (x_1 \lor \neg x_2 \lor \neg x_3).$
- The above is satisfied by assigning true to x_1 .
- The arithmetized formula is

 $\Phi(x_1, x_2, x_3) = (x_1 + x_2 + x_3) \times [x_1 + (1 - x_2) + (1 - x_3)].$

- Indeed, $\sum_{x_1=0,1} \sum_{x_2=0,1} \sum_{x_3=0,1} \Phi(x_1, x_2, x_3) = 16 \neq 0.$
- We have n = 3 and m = 2.
- A prime q that satisfies $q > 2^3 \times 3^2 = 72$ is 73.

An Example (continued)

• The table below is an execution of the algorithm in Z_{73} when Peggy follows the protocol.

i	$P_i^*(z)$	$P_i^*(0) + P_i^*(1)$	$= v_{i-1}?$	r_i	v_i
0					0
1	$4z^2 + 8z + 2$	16	no		

• Victor therefore rejects ϕ early on at i = 1.

An Example (continued)

- Now suppose Peggy does not follow the protocol.
- In order to deceive Victor, she comes up with fake polynomials $P_i(z)$ from i = 1.
- The table below is an execution of the algorithm.

i	$P_i(z)$	$P_i(0) + P_i(1)$	$= v_{i-1}?$	r_i	v_i
0					0
1	$8z^2 + 11z + 27$	0	yes	2	35
2	$z^2 + 8z + 13$	35	yes	3	46
3	$3z^2 + z + 21$	46	yes	r_3	$P_{3}(r_{3})$

An Example (concluded)

- Victor has been satisfied up to round 3.
- Finally at Step 12, Victor checks if

 $\Phi(2,3,r_3) \equiv P_3(r_3) \mod{73}.$

- It can be verified that the only choices of r₃ ∈ {0,1,...,72} that can mislead Victor are 31 and 59.
- The probability of that happening is only $2/73.^{a}$

^aMs. Ching-Ju Lin (R92922038) on January 7, 2004, pointed out an error in an earlier calculation.

An Example

- $(x_1 \lor x_2) \land (x_1 \lor \neg x_2) \land (\neg x_1 \lor x_2) \land (\neg x_1 \lor \neg x_2).$
- The above is unsatisfiable.
- The arithmetized formula is

 $\Phi(x_1, x_2) = (x_1 + x_2) \times (x_1 + 1 - x_2) \times (1 - x_1 + x_2) \times (2 - x_1 - x_2).$

• Because $\Phi(x_1, x_2) = 0$ for any *boolean* assignment $\{0, 1\}^2$ to (x_1, x_2) , certainly

$$\sum_{x_1=0,1}\sum_{x_2=0,1}\Phi(x_1,x_2)=0$$

• With n = 2 and m = 4, a prime q that satisfies $q > 2^2 \times 3^4 = 4 \times 81 = 324$ is 331.

An Example (concluded)

• The table below is an execution of the algorithm in Z_{331} .

i	$P_i^*(z)$	$P_i^*(0) + P_i^*(1)$	$= v_{i-1}?$	r_i	v_i
0					0
1	z(z+1)(1-z)(2-z)	0	yes	10	283
	+(z+1)z(2-z)(1-z)				
2	$(10+z)\times(11-z)$	283	yes	5	46
	imes (-9+z) imes (-8-z)				

- Victor calculates $\Phi(10,5) \equiv 46 \mod 331$.
- As it equals $v_2 = 46$, Victor accepts ϕ as unsatisfiable.

Objections to the Soundness Proof?^a

- Based on the steps required of a cheating Peggy on p. 694, why must we go through so many rounds (in fact, *n* rounds)?
- Why not just go directly to round *n*:
 - Victor sends $r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{n-1}$ to Peggy.
 - Peggy returns with a (claimed) $P_n^*(z)$.
 - Victor accepts if and only if $\Phi(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_{n-1}, r_n) \equiv P_n^*(r_n) \mod q \text{ for a random}$ $r_n \in \mathbb{Z}_q.$

^aContributed by Ms. Emily Hou (D89011) and Mr. Pai-Hsuen Chen (R90008) on January 2, 2002.

Objections to the Soundness Proof? (continued)

- Let us analyze the compressed proposal when ϕ is satisfiable.
- To succeed in foiling Victor, Peggy must find a polynomial $P_n(z)$ of degree m such that

 $\Phi(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_{n-1}, z) \equiv P_n(z) \mod q.$

- But this she is able to do: Just give the verifier the polynomial $\Phi(r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{n-1}, z)!$
- What has happened?

Objections to the Soundness Proof? (concluded)

- You need the intermediate rounds to "tie" Peggy up with a chain of claims.
- In the original algorithm on p. 687, for example, $P_n(z)$ is bound by the equality $P_n(0) + P_n(1) \equiv v_{n-1} \mod q$ in Step 8.
- That v_{n-1} is in turn derived by an earlier polynomial $P_{n-1}(z)$, which is in turn bound by $P_{n-1}(0) + P_{n-1}(1) \equiv v_{n-2} \mod q$, and so on.

Shamir's Theorem $^{\rm a}$

Theorem 89 IP = PSPACE.

- We first sketch the proof for IP \subseteq PSPACE.
- Without loss of generality, assume:
 - If $x \in L$, then the probability that x is accepted by the verifier is at least 3/4.
 - If $x \notin L$, then the probability that x is accepted by the verifier with any prover is at most 1/4.

^aShamir (1990).

The Proof (continued)

- Now we track down every possible message exchange based on random choices by the verifier and all possible messages generated by the prover.
- Use recursion to calculate

 $\operatorname{prob}[\operatorname{verifier accepts} x]$

as

 $\max_{P} \operatorname{prob}[(V, P) \text{ accepts } x].$

• If this value is at least 3/4, then acce[t x; otherwise, reject x.

The Proof (continued)

- To prove PSPACE \subseteq IP, we next prove that QSAT is in IP.
- We do so by describing an interactive protocol that decides QSAT.
- Suppose Alice and Bob are given

$$\phi = \forall x \exists y (x \lor y) \land \forall z [(x \land z) \lor (y \land \neg z)] \lor \exists w [z \lor (y \land \neg w)].$$

 As above, we assume no occurrence of a variable is separated by more than one ∀ from its point of quantification.

- We also assume that ¬ is applied only to variables, not subexpressions.
- We now arithmetize ϕ as before except:
 - -1 means true.

$$\neg x \rightarrow 1 - x.$$

 $\ast\,$ It is the standard representation on p. 134.

$$- \exists x \to \sum_{x=0,1}.$$

$$- \forall x \to \prod_{x=0,1}$$
.

• Alice tries to convince Bob that this arithmetization of ϕ is nonzero.

• Our ϕ becomes

$$A_{\phi} = \prod_{x=0}^{1} \sum_{y=0}^{1} \{ (x+y) \cdot \prod_{z=0}^{1} [(x \cdot z + y \cdot (1-z)) + \sum_{w=0}^{1} (z + y \cdot (1-w))] \}.$$

- Call it a $\sum -\prod$ expression.
- A_{ϕ} is a number; it equals 96 here.

- As before, ϕ is true if and only if $A_{\phi} > 0$.
- In fact, more is true.
- For any ϕ and any truth assignment to its free variables:
 - If ϕ is true, then $A_{\phi} > 0$ under the corresponding 0-1 assignment.
 - If ϕ is false, then $A_{\phi} = 0$.
- So Alice only has to convince Bob that $A_{\phi} > 0$.

- The trouble is that A_{ϕ} evaluated can be exponential in length.
- Fortunately, it can be shown that if expression A_{ϕ} of length *n* is nonzero, then there is a prime *p* between 2^n and 2^{3n} such that $A_{\phi} \neq 0 \mod p$.
- So Alice only has to convince Bob that $A_{\phi} \neq 0$ under mod p.
- The protocol starts with Alice sending Bob p (assume p = 13) and its primality certificate.

• Now Alice sends Bob $A_{\phi} \mod p$, which is

$$a = 96 \mod 13 = 5.$$

- Each stage starts with the following:
 - A $\sum -\prod$ expression A, with a leading \sum_x or \prod_x .
 - -A's alleged value $a \mod p$, supplied by Alice.
- If the first ∑ or ∏ is deleted, the result is a polynomial in x, called A'(x).
- Bob demands from Alice the coefficients of A'(x).
- Trouble occurs if the degree of A'(x) is exponential in n.

- Luckily, $\deg(A'(x)) \le 2n$.
 - No occurrence of a variable is separated by more than one \forall from its point of quantification.
 - So A'(x) has only one \prod symbol.
 - Other \prod s are over quantities not related to x, hence purely numerical.
 - Symbols other than \prod can only increase the degree of A'(x) by at most one $(x \cdot x \cdots)$.
 - For example, $\sum_{y} (x+y) \prod_{z} (x + \sum_{w} (x \cdot w))$.
- So Alice has no problem transmitting A'(x) to Bob.

- $A'(x) = 2x^2 + 8x + 6.$
- Bob verifies that $A'(0) \cdot A'(1) = 5 \mod 13$.
- Indeed $A'(0) \cdot A'(1) = 6 \cdot 16 = 5 \mod 13$.
- So far A'(x) is consistent with the alleged value 5.
- Bob deletes the leading \prod_x .
- The *free variable* x in the resulting expression prevents it from being an evaluation problem.

• So Bob replaces x with a random number mod 13, say 9:

$$\sum_{y=0}^{1} \left\{ (9+y) \cdot \prod_{z=0}^{1} \left[(9 \cdot z + y \cdot (1-z)) + \sum_{w=0}^{1} (z + y \cdot (1-w)) \right] \right\}.$$

• The above equals

$$a = A'(9) = 2 \cdot 9^2 + 8 \cdot 9 + 6 = 6 \mod 13.$$

• Bob sends 9 to Alice.

• In the new stage, Alice evaluates

$$A'(y) = 2y^3 + y^2 + 3y$$

after substituting x = 9 and sends it to Bob.

- Bob checks that $A'(0) + A'(1) = 6 \mod 13$.
- Indeed $0 + 6 = 6 \mod 13$.
- Bob deletes the leading \sum_{y} .
- Bob replaces y with a random number mod 13, say 3:

$$(9+3) \cdot \prod_{z=0}^{1} \left\{ \left[9 \cdot z + 3 \cdot (1-z) \right] + \sum_{w=0}^{1} \left[z + 3 \cdot (1-w) \right] \right\}.$$

• The above should equal $A'(3) = 2 \cdot 3^2 + 3^2 + 3 \cdot 3 = 7 \mod 13.$

• So

$$A = \prod_{z=0}^{1} \{ [9 \cdot z + 3 \cdot (1-z)] + \sum_{w=0}^{1} [z + 3 \cdot (1-w)] \}$$

should equal

$$a = 12^{-1} \cdot 7 = 12 \cdot 7 = 6 \mod 13.$$

• Bob sends 3 to Alice.

• In the new stage, Alice evaluates

$$A'(z) = 8z + 6$$

after substituting y = 3 and sends it to Bob.

- Bob checks that $A'(0) \cdot A'(1) = 6 \mod 13$.
- Indeed $6 \cdot 14 = 6 \mod 13$.
- Bob deletes the leading \prod_z .
- Bob replaces z with a random number mod 13, say 7:

$$[9 \cdot 7 + 3 \cdot (1 - 7)] + \sum_{w=0}^{1} [7 + 3 \cdot (1 - w)].$$

- The above should equal $A'(7) = 8 \cdot 7 + 6 = 10 \mod 13$.
- So

$$A = \sum_{w=0}^{1} [z + 3 \cdot (1 - w)]$$
(15)

should equal

$$a = 10 - [9 \cdot 7 + 3 \cdot (1 - 7)] = 10 - 45 = 4 \mod 13.$$

• Bob sends 7 to Alice.

• In the new stage, Alice evaluates

$$A'(w) = 10 - 3w$$

after substituting z = 7 and sends it to Bob.

- Bob checks that $A'(0) + A'(1) = 4 \mod 13$.
- Indeed $10 + 7 = 4 \mod 13$.
- Now there are no more $\sum s$ and $\prod s$.
- Bob checks if A'(w) is indeed as claimed by using (15) with z = 7.
- It is, and Bob accepts $A_{\phi} \neq 0 \mod 13$.

- Clearly, if $A_{\phi} > 0$, the protocol convinces Bob of this.
- We next show that if $A_{\phi} = 0$, then Bob will be cheated with only negligible probability.

Lemma 90 Suppose $A_{\phi} = 0$ and Alice claims a nonzero value \boldsymbol{a} . Then with probability $\geq (1 - \frac{2n}{2^n})^{i-1}$, the value of \boldsymbol{a} claimed at the *i*th stage is wrong.